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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
WILLIAM ANDREWS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with three counts of 
murder in the first degree in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1973), for the murder of Carol 
Naisbitt, Michelle Ansley and Stanley Walker; and two 
counts of aggravated robbery in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (Supp. 1973), for the robbery of 
Orren W. Walker and Stanley Walker during the robbery of 
the Ogden Hi Fi Shop on April 22, 1974. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found 
guilty on all five counts on November 15, 1974. A separate 
CASE NO. 
13902 
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hearing was held to determine sentence on the three murder 
convictions and on November 20, 1974, the jury unanimously 
recommended that appellant be sentenced to death on all 
three counts of first degree murder. On November 27, 
1974, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist sentenced appellant 
to death by shooting on all counts of first degree murder* 
Appellant was also sentenced to an indeterminate term of 
not less than five years to life imprisonment on the two 
counts of aggravated robbery. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment of the jury at both the trial and the hearing 
on sentence* In the alternative, if this Court determines 
that the death penalty-as provided in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-207 (Supp. 1973) is unconstitutional, respondent 
seeks an order remanding the case to the trial court 
solely to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Monday, April 22, 1974, three people (Stanley 
Walker, Michelle Ansley and Carol Naisbitt} were tortured 
and murdered in the basement of the Ogden Hi Fi Shop; two 
others, Orren W. Walker and Cortney Naisbitt, were likewise 
brutally tortured but survived (Tr.3G7Q,3073-3074,3084-
3087,3101-3113). rOrren Walker was forced by appellant and 
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his co-defendant, Pierre, to drink a caustic substance 
later identified as liquid Drano (T.2890), after which his 
mouth was taped (T.3087).[One of Mr. Walker's assailants 
then fired a shot at him at close range which missed; 
however, a second shot was fired which penetrated Mr. 
Walkerfs head (T.3103)./ Later^ball point pen was 
.—~^  
stomped into Mr. Walker's ear by appellants' co-defendant, 
Pierre (T.3110-3111). Mr. Walker was also choked around 
the neck with an electrical cord by Pierre (T.3110). 
Cortney Naisbitt was likewise forced by appellant 
^——— 
and co-defendant, Pierre, to drink the liquid Drano which he 
was unable to expell and which burned his mouth, throat, 
esophagus and intestines (T.2548,2550,2551). As a result, 
Cortney required surgery on his intestinal track and an 
esophagus transplant. Cortney was also shot in the 
head (T.3101), which caused paralysis (T.2548). / The 
murders and attempted murders were committed during the 
robbery of the Hi Pi•Shop (Tr.2866-2885,2930-A-2940). 
Later, during the week of April 22, 1974, appellant, 
Dale Pierre, and Keith Roberts (all airmen from Hill 
Air Force Base) were arrested and charged with three 
counts of First Degree Murder and two counts of aggravated 
robbery for the crimes committed at the Hi Fi Shop. The 
three men were tried to a jury with the Honorable John F. 
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Wahlquist, Judge of the Second District Court of Utah, 
presiding. The trial began October 15, 1974, and ended 
on November 20, 1974. The jury found appellant and Dale 
Pierre guilty on all five counts and Roberts guilty on 
two counts of aggravated robbery and recommended that 
appellant and Dale Pierre receive the death penalty for 
the murders of Carol Naisbitt, Stanley Walker, and 
Michelle Ansley. 
The evidencepresented by the state against 
appellant was extensive. Besides the eyewitness account of 
Orren Walker, one of the victims, sixty-five witnesses and 
over 300 pieces of physical evidence implicated appellant 
in the crime (Tr.4347-4362). ^--^_ 
George Platco, the State's first witness, testi-
fied that in February of 1974 while he was on barracks 
duty with appellant that appellant stated: "One of these 
days I would like to rob a Hi Fi Shop and if anybody gets 
in my way I will kill them"(Tr.1549). 
Neal T. Robins testified that in November, 197 3, 
he sold a blue 1970 Chevrolet Van to appellant and that 
Andrews expressed a desire to put special wheels ("mags") 
and tires on the van (Tr.l559)c Robins further testified 
that he saw appellant in the van approximately 30-40 days 
later and the van had mag wheels on it (Tr.1560,1563)* 
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Steven Brunetti and Bob Jensen saw appellant 
and Pierre writing down the prices of stereo equipment 
in the Hi Fi Shop on Saturday, April 20th (Tr.1577, 
1590).y William Harker, a doorman and cashier (Tr.1610) 
at the Hill Air Force Base movie theater, testified that 
Pierre saw the movie "Magnum Force" during April, 1974 
(Tr.1613). He also explained that there was a scene 
in the movie in which someone is murdered by being forced 
to drink Drano. )Robert Burbidge stated that Pierre rented 
a storage unit on April 22, 1974, and signed a lease 
agreement to that effect (Tr.1663,1670). This lease 
agreement was found in Pierre's room when searched by 
police after the Hi Fi Shop crimes (Tr.2467). ^ A search 
of the storage unit pursuant to a search warrant uncovered 
a large quantity of stereo equipment which Brent Richardson, 
owner of the Hi Fi Shop, identified as coming from his 
store (Tr.2858,2929-2946). Fingerprints of appellant 
and Pierre were found on stereo objects in the shed. 
A bottle ofdrano and a plastic cup were also found in 
the shed (Tr.2989,3028,2859), during the search. 
Theodore Tatten, a security guard, testified 
that he saw a blue Chevrolet van going east on 23rd 
Street at about 4:20 on April 22, 1974. The van stopped 
and parked on 23rd Street, which was approximately a 
block from the Hi Fi Shop. Mr. Tatten stated that 
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appellant and Pierre got out of the van and walked 
west on 23rd Street towards Washington Boulevard in the 
direction of the Hi Fi Shop (Tr.1688-1690). Ralph Brooks, 
a meter reader, testified that he observed Keith Roberts 
driving a blue van east on 23rd Street in the afternoon 
on April 22nd. He observed that the van had special wide 
tires and chrome wheels or "mags" (Tr.1699-1701) . 
Another witness, Jeffrey Maxwell, testified that he 
saw a blue panel van with aluminum slotted "mags" 
in the parking lot behind the Hi Fi Shop around 6:00 
on April 22nd (Tr.1827-1829). He also testified that 
he saw two black men standing by the van near the back 
door of the Hi Fi Shop (Tr.1824-1826) passing things 
from the building into the van (Tr.1829-1830). 
Sandra Johnson testified that she saw Mrs. 
Carol Naisbitt go into the Hi Fi Shop on April 22, 1974, 
and she saw Pierre come out of the shop briefly and go 
back in the same night (Tr.1768). She talked to Pierre 
and noticed that he had a "different" accent. Pierre 
is a native of Trinidad and has an accent. In addition, 
two other witnesses, Bob Jensen and Robert Burbidge, 
testified concerning Pierre's accent (Tr«3294,1593,1667). 
Several people testified linking several 
pieces of physical evidence to appellant. Two young 
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boys, Walter Grissom and Charles Maxwell, found the 
wallets and purses of the victims in a garbage dumpster 
next to appellant's barracks the day after the murder 
(Tr.2120,2134). Other witnesses traced the chain of 
custody of a .25 caliber pistol owned by defendant 
Roberts' roommate which was borrowed by Roberts two 
or three days before the Hi Fi Shop incident and 
reappeared a day or two after the crime (Exhibit # 70) 
(Tr.2263,2312,2337,2374,2376,2377). A .25 caliber 
pistolwasjused to kill the victims in the Hi Fi murders 
(Tr.2082,2188) (Exhibit # 70). Itjwas established by 
an FBI ballistics expert that the gun owned by Roberts' 
roommate was used in the Hi Fi murders (Tr.1978-1979) 
(Exhibit # 70). Likewise, both .25 and .38 caliber slugs 
were found in the basement of the Hi Fi Shop (Tr.1892). 
Police officers stated that they found additional personal 
items of identification belonging to the victims in the 
dumpster next to appellant's barracks. Pursuant to a 
search warrant police searched Pierre's room and testified 
that they found a copy of the storage unit lease agreement 
which Pierre had entered into for the premises where the 
stolen Hi Fi equipment was recovered. Pursuant to a search 
warrant police searched appellant's room and found cellophane 
wrappers with Hi Fi ShQjL labels. Hi Fi wrappers were also 
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found in the garbage can in the latrine of appellant's 
barracks (Tr.2588,2659-2663). The storage unit was 
searched on the basis of a search warrant and Brent 
Richardson identified the stereo equipment found there 
as coming from his store (Tr.2858,2929-2940). Finger-
prints of appellant and Pierre were found on objects 
in the storage shed (Tr.2989f3028). 
Most damning of all was the testimony of 
Orren Walker. He explained how he came to the Hi Fi 
Shop looking for his son, Stanley, on the night of 
April 22, 1974 (Tr.3070). Mr. Walker stated that Pierre 
was at the top of the stairs which led to the basement 
of the Hi Fi Shop and was holding a small caliber 
automatic pistol and appellant was at the bottom of 
those stairs holding a short nose revolver (Tr.3068). 
Appellant aimed his gun at Mr. Walker as Mr. Walker was 
forced to come down the stairs into the basement (Tr. 
3070). Mr. Walker then saw Cortney Naisbitt, Michelle 
Ansley, and Mr. Walker's son, Stanley Walker, tied up 
in the basement of the Hi Fi Shop (Tr.3070). Th^j/roung 
people^pleaded with appellant and Pierre. MichelJLB^said, 
^I'm just 19, I don't want to die." Cortney said, "I'm 
-8-
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young, I don't want to die." (Tr.3074). Appellant and 
Pierre then poured a caustic substance later determined 
to be Drano into a plastic cup and gave it to Orren Walker 
to administer to the young people (Tr.3077). Mr. Walker 
did not make any movement and appellant aimed his gun 
at Mr. Walker and said, "Man, there is a gun at your 
head." (Tr.3078). Mr. Walker was then bound with zip 
cord (Tr.3078-79). Mrs. Naisbitt arrived a little later 
and appellant and Pierre tied her up with the others 
(Tr.3083). 
When all of the victims were tied up, appellant 
and Pierre began forcing them to drink the caustic liquid 
(Tr.3085). When Michelle Ansley asked what the liquid 
was, appellant identified it as a mixture of vodka and 
a german drug (Tr.3077). When the victims began coughing 
and vomiting.^fte^jarijiking the substance, appellant and 
Pierre put tape across Mr. Walker's and Mrs. Naisbitt's 
mouths (Tr.3088). 
After some discussion between appellant and 
Pierre, Pierre began shooting the victims. Mrs. Naisbitt 
was shot first, followed by Cortney, then Pierre fired a 
shot at Mr. Walker's head which missed and hit the floor• 
Pierre then shot Stanley and shot Mr. Walker, hitting him 
in the head (Tr.3101-3103). Pierre then untied Michelle 
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Ansley and took her in the back room. She returned several 
minutes later naked and Mr. Walker heard her pleading^„with 
appellant'jg co-defendant Pierre (Tr.3109). 
The testimony of Dr. Serge Moore, the State 
Medical Examiner, established that Michelle Ansley had 
sexual intercourse the evening of the 22nd between 8:00 
and 10:00 p.m. During that time she was bound hand 
and foot injhe basement of the Hi Fi Shop (Tr. 2176-2178) 
except for the several minutes referred to above. Pierre 
then laid her next to Mr. Walker and shot her (Tr.3110). 
Pierre also shot Stanley again after shooting Michelle 
and then strangled Mr. Walker (Tr.3110). A little later 
Pierre kicked a pen into Orren Walker's ear and apparently 
left. Orren Walker's testimony established that appellant 
was the one who several times poured the caustic liquid 
into the cups while Pierre forced the victims to drink 
it (Tr.3085). Mr. Walker also stated that appellant told 
Pierre to take Orren Walker's entire wallet not just the 
money in it (Tr.3095). Mr. Walker further testified that 
he was not sure that only one person (Pierre) was present 
when Michelle and Stanley were shot for the second time 
(Tr.3214) and that those shots were fired very rapidly in 
-10-
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succession intimating that two people could have been 
shooting (Tr.3214). 
Mr. Walker made no indication nor was there 
suggestion from appellant's counsel that appellant 
attempted in any way to stop Pierre from shooting the 
five victims or raping Michelle Ansley. Moreover, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 and 203 (Supp. 
1975), appellant is as culpable as Pierre for any crimes 
which Pierre personally and individually committed during 
the course of the robbery and murders. 
Some time after appellant and Pierre left the 
shop, help arrived and Cortney, Mrs. Naisbitt and Orren 
Walker were rushed to hospitals. Cortney Naisbitt survived 
but has not completely recovered and cannot remember the 
events of the crime (Tr.2538). Orren Walker, of course, 
survived, and the other three victims were dead on 
arrival. 
Appellant's defense consisted of one witness. 
His testimony covers six pages of transcript (Tr.3678-
3683). Appellant raised no affirmative defenses nor 
did he attempt to establish an alibi. 
On the basis of the strong evidence against 
appellant, the jury returned a verdict.of guilty. After 
a consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
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presented at the hearing on sentence, the jury also __ 
recommended that appellant receive the death penalty 
for his crimes. 
/ ARGUMENT 
• * ' POINT I 
RESPONDENT REARGUES POINTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5„ 
6, 7, 8, AND 12 OF THE STATEfS BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE 
BRIEF OF CO-DEFENDANT DALE PIERRE (UTAH SUPREME COURT 
NO. 13903), INSOFAR AS THE SUBSTANCE OF THOSE ARGUMENTS 
APPLIES TO APPELLANT ANDREWS. 
Appellant was charged and convicted of the 
identical crimes for which defendant Pierre was 
convicted. The arguments presented by respondent in 
Points I through VIII, and XII of their brief in 
State v. Pierre, No. 13903, concerning the constitutionality 
of the death penalty, the effect of pre-trial publicity, 
the court's proper denial of appellant's motions for 
change of venue, continuance, sequestration of the jury, 
and for separate trials, the admission of Dr. Naisbitt's 
testimony relating to the medical condition of his son, 
Cortney, and the propriety of the State's and appellant's 
burden of proof at the sentence hearing, apply equally 
to appellant Andrews. 
-12-
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Because of the identical nature of the issues 
raised and reargued by appellant Andrews (Appellant's 
Brief, Point I, p.3-4, and the addendum to his brief), 
respondent respectfully asks this Court to consider the 
above mentioned issues reargued in behalf of the State 
as to appellant Andrews with the following additions as 
to certain points: 
A. (POINT 4) 
THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IN THIS CASE IS PROPER 
IN THAT IT IS NOT EXCESSIVE OR DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE 
OFFENSE, AND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL AND AT 
THE SENTENCING HEARING SUPPORTS THE SENTENCE. 
As is argued in Point I of respondent's brief 
in State v. Pierre, we maintain that mandatory review of 
death penalty cases is not constitutionally required under 
Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2902 (1976), Proffitt v. 
Florida, 96 S.Ct. 2902 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 96 
S.Ct. 2950 (1976). 
Mr. Justice Stewart reiterated the primary 
concerns of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and 
Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2902 (1976), when he wrote: 
-13-
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"As a general proposition these 
concerns [of Furman] are best met by 
a system that provides for a bi-
furcated proceeding at which the 
sentencing authority is apprised of 
the information relevant to the 
imposition of sentence and provided 
with standards to guide its use of the 
information. 
We do not intend to suggest that 
only the above-described procedures 
would be permissible under Furman 
or that any sentencing system con-
structed along these general lines would 
inevitably satisfy the concerns of 
Furman,46 for each distinct system 
must be examined on an individual basis. 
* * * 
46 A system could have standards 
so vague that they would fail adequately 
to channel the sentencing decision 
patterns of juries with the result that a 
pattern of arbitrary and capricious j 
sentencing like that found unconstitu-
tional in Furman could occur." 96 U.S. 2935/ 
Respondent agrees that the statutory review 
provisions of Georgia, Florida and Texas were commended in 
dicta by the United States Supreme Court. The Court did 
not intimate, however, that such review was the only 
constitutionally permissible way that jury discretion 
could be controlled in order to prevent the arbitrary, 
capricious, wanton and discriminatory imposition of the 
death penalty. Statutory schemes like Utahfs which provide 
for bifurcated proceedings, require proof of aggravating 
circumstances/and allow evidence of any mitigating cir-
cumstances, also satisfy Furman. 
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Respondent submits that Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-207(3) (Supp. 1975), and prior Utah Supreme Court 
decisions (State v. Riley, 41 Utah 2d 225, 126 P.2d 294 
(1911), and State v. Stehbach, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050 
(1931)), coupled with traditional discretionary appeal, 
allow this Court to comprehensively review the case. 
This review contemplates a consideration of alleged 
errors of law and evidence of discrimination, arbitrari-
ness, and caprice in the sentencing phase. 
However, respondent submits that appellant in the present 
case has failed to meet his burden on appeal in that he 
has failed to support his allegations with citation from 
the transcript. Appellant relies by incorporation on 
the brief of his codefendant Pierre concerning presentation 
of mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing. Defendant 
Pierre called two witnesses at the sentencing hearing and 
their testimony is discussed in Point IV of respondents 
State v. Pierre brief. These witnesses were not called 
by or for appellant and their testimony is not directly 
applicable to him. 
Appellant was the only witness who testified in 
his behalf at the sentencing hearing. He talked about 
his personal history and background, including two 
previous crimes (Tr.4247-4258). Appellant makes no 
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specific reference in his brief to this testimony nor 
does he suggest what weight it had or should have. 
In the absence of such reference, respondent 
asserts that the evidence presented at trial and the 
sentencing hearing support the sentence imposed on 
appellant. Appellant makes no argument that his 
penalty is disproportionate and excessive in relation 
to his crimes. His testimony at the sentencing hearing 
was self-serving and uncorroborated. The jury in this 
case was able to observe appellant's demeanor and 
sincerity when he testified. The Utah death penalty 
statutes obligate the sentencing authority to weigh 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The jury 
determined that the death penalty was appropriate 
in this case and appellant presents no evidence to rebut 
that determination. ', ' 
Respondent submits that a comprehensive review 
of this case is appropriate and necessary* We maintainf 
however
 f that it is an impossible and inappropriate* 
burden on this Court to act as appellant's advocate in 
any review proceeding. Appellants failure to allege 
specific error in the sentencing hearing and his failure 
to support allegations of insufficient evidence with 
-16-
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facts or citation to the transcript does not obligate 
the Utah Supreme Court to rectify these shortcomings. 
Appellant's sentence is appropriate and not excessive 
or disproportionate to his crimes and should be 
affirmed. 
B. (Point 7) 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SEPARATE TRIAL AND NO PREJUDICE 
RESULTED THEREFROM. 
Respondent incorporates by reference Point VII 
of its brief in the appeal of Dale Pierre, supplementing 
it with the following paragraphs herein: . 
Unlike appellant Pierre, appellant Andrews included 
an affidavit in support of his motion to sever (T.67,70). 
However, that affidavit and the oral argument thereon 
(T. of Var. Pro. 23-31) presented no facts that indicated 
that the defendants1 defenses would be antagonistic. 
The substance of the affidavit was that appellant "strongly 
believed" that his defense strategy would differ from 
Pierre's because appellant would rely on a defense 
of withdrawal, while Pierre would try to discredit the 
-17-
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eyewitness testimony of Orren Walker and such discrediting 
would be adverse to appellant• 
The incorporated Point VII of respondent's 
brief in the Pierre appeal clearly refutes the implica-
tion of antagonistic defenses. Defenses may be 
different, even inconsistent, without being antagonistic. 
Appellant's affidavit fails to get beyond the stage of 
"belief," supposition and innuendo into the factual 
realm; therefore, the holding of State v. Rivenburgh, 
11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 (1960), that a self-serving 
affidavit, without more, does not require the granting 
of a motion to sever, is applicable. 
-18- ( 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SEQUESTER THE JURY 
AFTER TRIAL BUT PRIOR TO THE SENTENCING HEARING. 
Following appellant's conviction of three counts 
of first degree murder on Friday, November 15, 1974, he 
requested a sentencing hearing before the jury to deter-
mine penalty pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(1) 
(Supp. 1973). The trial court suggested that the 
sentencing hearing be held the following Tuesday, 
November 19, 1974, but the defense attorneys requested 
more time to obtain additional witnesses for the hearing 
(T. 4110). The state objected to any continuance beyond 
the following Tuesday (T. 4110,4112). At this point the 
judge asked the defense attorneys if they were willing 
to waive sequestering the jury (presumably if the court 
granted their request for additional time) (T.4110). 
Appellant's attorneys and Mr. Pierre's attorney then 
explicitly said they waived sequestration: 
"THE COURT: Now if you expect any 
type of sequester I require that you 
go ahead. Are you willing to wave 
[sic] that at this point? 
MR. ATHAY: We are willing to 
wave [sic] it. 
MR. CAINE: We also wave [sic] it." 
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The judge then suggested convening the sentencing 
hearing the following Wednesday, November 20, 1974, rather 
than Tuesday. The defense attorneys, apparently 
having thought they would receive more time than only 
one additional day began to have second thoughts about 
waiving sequestration: 
"MR. ATHAY: If it please the court, 
if all we are looking at is next 
Wednesday, I submit that one day is 
not going to make any difference, and 
we just as well proceed Tuesday with 
the sequester. If we are not going 
to sequester, we would ask for a week. 
If we are only going to go to Wednes-
day, we would move and request for 
sequestration." (Emphasis added.) 
(T.4111). 
Mr. Athay and Mr. Caine then withdrew their prior 
waiver's of sequestration (T.4111). The court set 
the sentencing hearing for 9:00 a.m. Wednesday, November 
20, 1974, and denied appellant's request to sequester 
the jury (T. 4114-4115). / ' 
Prior to dismissing the jury the court repeatedly 
admonished them as follows: 
" . . . it is extremely important there 
be no misconduct of jurors or anything 
of this sort, otherwise it will put a 
hardship on these people that is tre-
mendous. You understand this? Every-
one involved. 
So everyone would have to obey 
the rule very carefully to go ahead 
and if anyone trys to speak to you 
about the case just resist their efforts. 
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If anybody wants to compliment you 
or criticize you for your verdict or 
anything of this nature, tell them 
the proceedings are not over and to 
resist their efforts and of course 
take nothing serious that you would 
hear in such a way, you certainly 
know more about the case than any-
one who would ever speak to you 
about it." (T.4112). 
The judge then ordered those who work at Hill Air Force 
Base and at least four other jurors not to go to work 
(T.4113). Just prior to excusing the jury the court 
again reiterated its cautionary instructions: 
"You recognize the importance of 
still staying aloof of all of this? 
. •'. I suggest that you get clear 
from this building right now. Do 
not let anybody talk to you in any 
way. All the.admonitions and 
cautions that I have given you be-
fore please abide by them." (T.4114). 
Appellant admits in his brief that the trial court 
had discretion over the issue of jury sequestration, but 
alleges that the trial judge abused his discretion in 
denying appellant's motion to sequester. In support of 
this contention, appellant alleges that the environment 
in the community was "inherently prejudicial" (citing 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-27 (1953), as 
amended). 
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Sheppard v. Maxwell. 384 U.S. 333 (1966)), due to the 
extent of the publicity the trial allegedly received. 
Respondent submits that if such an "inherently 
prejudicial11 condition in fact existed in the community, 
why was appellant so readily willing to waive sequestering 
in return for a week's continuance of the sentencing 
hearing? The record clearly shows the defense attorneys 
saying that "if we are not going to sequester, we 
would ask for a week," but "if we are only going to 
.' . . Wednesday we move . . . for sequestration." 
(T.4111). One would think that in an "inherently 
prejudicial" community, the defense would want to 
reduce the amount of time a jury would remain un-
sequestered, not enlarge it. 
Respondent submits that the atmosphere in the 
community was not "inherently prejudicial" and further 
that appellant has offered nothing but conclusory, 
self-serving, unsubstantiated allegations in support 
of his position and thus has failed to meet his burden 
of proof. 
In Point V of this appeal, appellant similarly 
alleged it was prejudicial for the court not to sequester 
the jury during the trial because of the "inherently 
prejudicial" atmosphere in the community due to pre-
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trial news coverage of the case. Respondent, in answer 
to this claim, clearly established in Point V that the 
line of cases which discuss 'inherently prejudicial" 
publicity situations are inapplicable to the instant 
case. (See pp. 59-61 of Respondent's Brief in 
State v. Pierre, Case No. 13903). As respondent 
pointed out, the leading Utah case involving the claim 
of "inherently prejudicial" publicity is Sinclair v. 
Turner, 20 Utah 2d 126, 434 P.2d 305 (1967), cert, denied 
391 U.S. 924. In that case this Court held that pre-
trial publicity must be measured against a generally 
accepted standard of responsible journalism and if 
that standard is met, the publicity will not be held 
to be "inherently prejudicial." Appellant in the present 
case has made no effort to show or even allege that the 
news coverage to which the jurors might be exposed, 
violated the above standard. All he alleges is that 
the case was "widely publicized" and that the testimony 
Rideau v. Louisiana,373 U.S. 723 (1963); Sheppard 
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); and Estes v> Texas, 381 
U.S. 532 (1965). 
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at trial was "graphically portrayed daily to the 
public by both written and electronic media," Thus, 
the standard for "inherently prejudicial" publicity has 
not been met. 
Therefore, as was shown by respondent in 
Point V, the traditional rule requiring appellant to 
prove "identifiable prejudice" applies. See Murphy 
v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975), and pp. 51-59, and 
70-74 of Respondent's Brief in Pierre, supra. Under 
this rule, appellant must affirmatively show that news 
coverage in his case generated community bias to such 
a degree that his right to a fair trial was placed in 
jeopardy; he must show a causal nexus between such news 
reporting and actual juror exposure; and he must show 
the existence of actual juror prejudice as a result of 
improper publicity and the court's refusal to sequester 
the jury. See State v. Sales, 537 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1975), 
State v. Guertz, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961), 
and State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887 (1957). 
Respondent submits that appellant has failed to prove 
any of the above requirements. In fact, the record 
establishes the contrary; namely, (1) that the news 
coverage was not improper, (2) that there was no showing 
of actual juror exposure to the publicity, (3) that 
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the trial judge displayed extraordinary caution in 
admonishing the jury to stay away from sources of 
publicity and even forbad several jurors from re-
turning to their places of employment, and (4) that 
there was no showing of actual juror prejudice resulting 
from publicity. All appellant has alleged is that there 
was news coverage and community awareness of the case. 
Such clearly does not warrant sequestering a jury 
and the trial court properly refused to do so. 
In conclusion, respondent re-emphasizes the 
argument at pp. 70-74 of its brief in Pierre, supra, 
and submits that there was no abuse of discretion or 
reversible error in the trial court's denial of 
appellant's request to sequester the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing points and authorities 
contained herein and in respondent's brief in State v. 
Pierre, Case No. 13903, respondent submits that appellant's 
conviction and sentence were proper and should be affirmed« 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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